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Abstract 
We analyze the relationship between market size and entry when an incumbent and 
potentially an entrant compete to gain market share and advertising is the only strategic 
variable. Entry occurs when the relative effectiveness of incumbent's advertising is smaller 
than a threshold level that depends on the size of the market. This threshold level is 
monotonically and positively related to market size. Consequently, equilibrium with entry 
is more likely the greater is the size of the market. 
 
Key words: advertising; entry; market size 
JEL classification: D43 
 
 
                                           
Correspondance to : Institut des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Carthage Présidence 2016 
Tunis, Tunisia. E-mail: khaled.bennour@fdseps.rnu.tn. Tel: (216) 20475969. Fax: (216) 
71775944. I would like to thank Khaireddine Jebsi, a referee and a Board Member of this 
journal for helpful comments. 
 1
1. Introduction 
 
In many cases, competition between firms takes the form of a contest, where firms 
choose their prices and advertising levels in order to gain market share. In this paper, we 
consider a standard entry model. Assume that one firm, the incumbent, irreversibly 
precommits himself to a certain strategy before the potential entrant considers entry. Firms 
compete to gain market share and advertising is the only strategic variable. Schmalensee 
(1974) who questions whether the presence of a dynamic effect of advertising may lead to 
a barrier to entry, shows that the incumbent needs to have an advantage for the advertising 
to be of deterrence entry. However, the equilibrium achieved, with or without entry, does 
not depend on the size of the market. We show that this result is due to the linearity of the 
advertising cost function. With a more general nonlinear advertising cost, the size of the 
market does matter. 
We exclude the price as a decision variable. This assumption can be justified in 
many markets where there is little price competition. In the pharmaceutical industries, 
brands use advertising rather than price to influence the post-patent competition and then 
the entry decision of generic firms (Hellerstein (1998), Scott Morton (2000)). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we specify the 
model and notation. Section 3 derives the Stackelberg equilibrium and its properties. 
Section 4 presents a comparative statics analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper 
 
. 
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2. The Model 
 
Consider an incumbent firm X  and a rival Y who considers the possibility to enter 
into the incumbent's market. Let x  and y  denote the advertising spending of the 
incumbent and the entrant, respectively. These quantities measure the number of ads that 
firms send to consumers. The size V  of the market is fixed. We assume that firms have 
constant marginal production costs equal to c  and no fixed costs, and the price is regulated 
at the level p c> . Let m p c= −  the profit margin. The incumbent makes its advertising 
decision x  and then the potential entrant chooses its advertising effort y  under full 
knowledge of x . Let (.)Xc  be the advertising cost of firm X . We assume that Xc  is 
convex and strictly increasing with (0) 0Xc′ > . The advertising cost of firm Y  is described 
by the convex and strictly increasing function (.)Yc  with (0) 0Yc = , (0) 0Yc′ > , ( ) 0Yc y′′ ≥ , 
and ( ) 0Yc y′′′ ≤ . 
 In this paper, we assume that the market share S  of firm X  has the following 
form: 
 1
1
S y
xθ
=
+
 (1) 
 
where θ  is a positive parameter that indicates the effectiveness of incumbent's advertising 
against the entrant's advertising. This implies that, even if two firms expend the same 
amount of advertising effort, they may not have the same market share. If the incumbent’s 
advertising effort is twice as effective as that of its competitor ( 2θ = ), and the two 
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firms choose the same advertising spending, then the incumbent will achieve a market 
share  twice as large as the other's share. 
The relationship given in equation (1) has been employed in a number of fields, 
including the economics of advertising (Schmalensee (1972)), rent-seeking (Nitzan 
(1994)) and the economics of conflict (Hirshleifer (1995)). A large empirical and 
theoretical literature, published in marketing journals (Cooper and Nakanishi (1988)), has 
also adopted this relationship, which is referred to as a market share attraction form. The 
market share received by the incumbent, S , is increasing in his effort x  and decreasing in 
the effort of its competitor, y , as it obviously should. 
 The optimization problem of X  is 
 Maximize   ( ) 0X XSmV c x xπ = − ≥  (2) 
and the program of firm Y  is 
 Maximize   (1 ) ( ) y 0Y YS mV c yπ = − − ≥  (3) 
                       
3. Equilibrium 
 
To analyze the allocation of the advertising spending in this scenario, we begin by 
considering the second-stage choice of firm Y . At this second stage, firm Y  takes x  as 
given and chooses y  solution to the program (3). We are interested in deriving the 
conditions under which Y  chooses not to enter, that is when 0y = . 
Since Yπ  is strictly concave in the strategy y , the maximizer is unique. The 
solution is given in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 1: Let det / (0)Yx mV cθ ′= . Given the advertising spending x  of the incumbent, 
the optimal reaction y  of the potential entrant is null for detx x≥  and strictly positive for 
det0 x x< <  with x  and y  satisfying 
 2( ) ( )YmVx x y c yθ θ ′= +  (4) 
 
In equation (4), detx  is the minimum spending of firm X  to advertising necessary 
to prevent entry. detx  depends positively on the size V  of the market and the profit margin 
m  and depends negatively on the relative effectiveness θ  of the incumbent's advertising. 
The threshold detx  depends negatively on the value of (0)Yc′ , which approximates the 
average cost to the entrant of small levels of advertising spending. Figure 1 depicts the 
best-reply y  of the potential entrant to the advertising spending of the incumbent, x , for 
two different marginal cost functions (.)Yc′ .  For detx x< , there is an inverted-U shaped 
relationship between y  and x . Otherwise, y  equals 0 .  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
When entry is allowed and the incumbent choice is fixed, there is a positive 
relationship between the advertising spending of the entrant and the attractiveness of the 
market, measured by mV , but the effect of an increase in the relative effectiveness of 
incumbent's advertising on the advertising spending of the entrant is ambiguous. 
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We consider now the choice of the first stage of the incumbent. At this first stage, 
the incumbent chooses its advertising spending x  solution to the program (2). When 
choosing x , the incumbent firm takes into account the reaction of the potential entrant. 
If detx x≥ , then 0y =  and 1S = . Equation (2) implies that the profit of the 
incumbent, for detx x≥ , is a decreasing function of x . Consequently, the optimal choice of 
the incumbent is obtained at x  not greater than detx . 
Let's begin by showing that the constraint 0x ≥  is not binding. We have: 
 
Lemma 1: When 0x →  then 0y →  and /y x →+∞ . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Furthermore, we have: 
 
Lemma 2:   In the limit as x  approaches zero, the derivative of Xπ  with respect to x  
becomes infinite. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
It follows from Lemma 2 that the optimal choice of the incumbent is positive. We 
show next that the type of equilibrium, with or without entry, depends on the sign of the 
(left-hand) derivative of Xπ  at detx x= . 
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Consider first the case in which the (left-hand) derivative /Xd dxπ  is negative for 
detx x= . The profit function  of the incumbent has an interior maximum at a value of x  
that satisfies 
 det( ) with 0X
S dy S mV c x x x
x dx y
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ′+ = < <⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠  (5) 
The first term in the left-hand side of equation (5) captures the direct effect of greater 
advertising effort x  by the incumbent on its profit. The second term represents the 
strategic effect of x  on the choice of the potential entrant. In this case, the incumbent 
maximizes its profit by choosing its advertising spending such that the marginal revenue 
equals the marginal cost. Given that this advertising level is smaller than detx , the entry is 
then allowed. 
 Consider second the case in which the (left-hand) derivative /Xd dxπ  is not 
negative at detx x= . We need the following Lemma: 
 
Lemma 3: The marginal revenue of the incumbent for all x  such that det0 x x< <  is 
greater than its marginal revenue at detx x= . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
 Let S dy SR
x dx y
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ . By Lemma 3 it comes that  
det det( ) ( ) ( ) ( )X XR x mV R x mV c x c x′ ′> ≥ ≥  for all det0 x x< < . Hence, /Xd dxπ  is positive 
for det0 x x< <  and the profit function of the incumbent is strictly increasing. 
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Consequently, the incumbent chooses an advertising spending equal to detx  and then entry 
is prevented. We summarize the preceding analysis with the following 
 
Lemma 4:  The type of equilibrium, with or without entry, depends on the sign of the (left-
hand) derivative of Xπ  at detx x= . The entry is prevented if and only if this derivative is 
not negative. 
 
4. Comparative Statics 
 
 Depending on the configuration of parameters θ  and V , the incumbent will or will 
not seek to deter entry. If the relative effectiveness of the incumbent's advertising, θ , is 
smaller or equal than a critical level, then, entry is allowed for all values of the market 
size. Otherwise, the incumbent finds profitable to deter entry provided that the market size 
is not large. 
We show easily that the (left-hand) derivative of Xπ  for detx x=  is given by 
 det 2
(0)( ) ( / (0))
2 (0) /[ (0)]
X Y
X Y
Y Y
d cx x c mV c
dx mVc c
π θ θ′ ′ ′= = −′′ ′+  (6)  
Let's consider the special case in which ( )Xc x x=  and ( )Yc y y= . In this case, 
explicit solution for equation (4) and well-behaved reduced-form profit function are 
obtained. Equation (6) becomes: 
det( ) 1
2
Xd x x
dx
π θ= = −  
and then we obtain the result derived by Schmalensee (1974): 
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Proposition 2: When marginal advertising costs are constant, with  1X Yc c′ ′= ≡ , the type of 
equilibrium does not depend on the size of the market. Furthermore, the entry is prevented 
only when the incumbent has an advantage for the effectiveness of its advertising, with 
2θ ≥ . 
 
When considering to change its advertising spending, the incumbent compares its 
marginal revenue with its constant marginal cost. One can show easily that the marginal 
revenue, for det0 x x< < , is positive and decreasing. The equilibrium does not depend on 
the size of the market since marginal revenue at detx x=  depends only on the relative 
effectiveness θ  of the incumbent's advertising. 
In contrast, when advertising costs are nonlinear, the size of the market does 
matter. Figures 2, 3 and 4 illustrate the following results. 
 
Proposition 3: For a given value of θ , there are two cases: 
(i) If 2 (0) / (0)X Yc cθ ′ ′≤ , then entry is allowed for all values of V . 
(ii) if 2 (0) / (0)X Yc cθ ′ ′> , there exists a threshold level V ∗  such that entry is 
prevented when the size of the market V  is not larger than V ∗  and entry is 
allowed when V  is larger than V ∗ . θ  and V ∗  are monotonically and positively 
related. 
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Proposition 4: For a given value V , there exists a threshold level θ ∗  such that for θ  not 
smaller than θ ∗  entry is prevented and for θ  smaller than θ ∗  entry is allowed. 
Furthermore, V  and θ ∗  are monotonically and positively related. 
 
 Insert Figures 2, 3 and 4 
 
Hence, the result of Proposition 4 shows that a larger size of the market implies a 
higher probability of the entry accommodating equilibrium. The intuition is the follows. 
When the size of the market is high, strong incentives exist for the potential entrant to 
advertise to gain market share. It follows that the incumbent needs to spend heavily on 
advertising to deter the entry of its competitor. But in this situation, since the advertising 
exhibits increasing marginal cost, the marginal revenue will be smaller than the marginal 
cost. Consequently, the incumbent prefers to moderate his spending in advertising and then 
enter occurs. 
 Considering more general specifications for advertising costs yields another 
striking result which contrasts with the result obtained in the Proposition 2. The incumbent 
may have incentives to deter entry even though it does not exist an advantage for the 
effectiveness of its advertising. For example, the entry deterring equilibrium may hold for 
θ  not larger than one. That's when 2 (0) / (0)X Yc c′ ′  is smaller than θ  and the size of the 
market is small enough (V V ∗< ) (see figure 2). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
We showed that the size of the market matters when analyzing a Stackelberg model 
in which an incumbent and a potential entrant compete to gain market share and 
advertising is the only strategic variable. Ellison and Ellison (2000) report evidence that 
drugs with higher revenues are most likely to attract generic entry. Scott Morton (2000) 
analyzes the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and question whether pre-expiration brand 
advertising deters generic entry. She shows that market attractiveness, measured by pre-
expiration brand revenue, is the most important factor determining the number of entrants. 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: Equation (4) yields 2 2( ) (0)Y YmVx y c y y cθ ′ ′≥ ≥ . Then 
20 / (0)Yy mVx cθ ′< ≤ . It follows that 0y →  for 0x → . Also, it comes form Equation (4) 
that / /( ( )) 1Yy x mV xc yθ θ ′= − . Since ( ) 0Yxc y′ →  for 0x → , hence /y x →+∞  for 
0x → . 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Using Equation (4) and by applying the envelope theorem, we obtain 
the derivative /dy dx  and then we have 
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2 2
( ) 2 ( ) ( )
( ) 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 2
2 ( ) ( ) / ( )
( ) ( ) ( / )
2 ( ) ( ) / ( )
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
y c y mV x y c yR
x y mV x y c y x y c y
y c y c y mV x y mVx
x mV mV mVx mVx x y c y c y
y c y c y mV y x
x mV mV mV mV x y c y c y
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ
θ
θ
θ
⎧ ⎫′ ′− += − ⎨ ⎬′ ′′+ + + +⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫′ ′ + −= − ⎨ ⎬′′ ′+ +⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫′ ′ −= − ⎨ ⎬′′ ′+ +⎩ ⎭
 
 
Hence, R A B= + , with ( ) 11
2 ( ) ( ) / ( )
Y
Y Y
y c yA
x mV x y c y c yθ
⎡ ⎤′= −⎢ ⎥′′ ′+ +⎣ ⎦
 and  
( )
2 ( ) ( ) / ( )
Y
Y Y
c yB
mV x y c y c y
θ
θ
⎡ ⎤′= ⎢ ⎥′′ ′+ +⎣ ⎦
. By Lemma 1, it comes that (0)
2
YcB
mV
θ ′→  and 
A→+∞  for 0x → . 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: For detx x= , 0A =  and det(0) 2 (0) / (0)
Y
Y Y
cB
mV x c c
θ
θ
⎡ ⎤′= ⎢ ⎥′′ ′+⎣ ⎦
. 
For det0 x x< < , 0A > . We then need to show that 
det
( ) (0)
2 ( ) ( ) / ( ) 2 (0) / (0)
Y Y
Y Y Y Y
c y c
mV x y c y c y mV x c c
θ θ
θ θ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′ ′≥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥′′ ′ ′′ ′+ + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
Since ( ) (0)Y Yc y c′ ′≥  and ( ) (0)Y Yc y c′′ ′′≤ , the proof is completed if we show that 
det( )x y xθ θ+ ≤  for every ( , )x y  verifying equation (4). But equation (4) yields 
2( ) ( )YmVx x y c yθ θ ′= +  and det 2 det 2( ) (0)YmVx x cθ θ ′= . Consequently, for every x  such that 
det0 x x< <  we have : 
2 det 2 det 2 2 det 2( ) ( ) ( ) (0) ( ) ( )Y Y Yx y c y mVx x c x c yθ θ θ θ′ ′ ′+ ≤ = ≤  
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